Much Ado About a Mite
Berkeley argues for his idealism from the relativity of perception. He compares the size of a mite's foot as seen by the mite itself, by a human and by some smaller microorganism. What, exactly, is the argument? Is the argument successful? If not, how do we resist the sucking of all so-called primary qualities into the mind?
In the dialogues, Berkley tries to prove that material substance does not exist. One of his arguments suggests that a mite would appear a small to a human, and huge to something even smaller than the mite. He claims that this means that there is no such thing as objectively big or small since it cannot be both at the same time. Size does not exist objectively, instead, it is relative to the perceiver. For this reason, it is in the mind of the perceiver, not outside as an objective property. He later did something similar to color, and smell, other senses. this argument helped him reach the conclusion that there is no material substance, everything is just a set of ideas existing in the mind. I believe Berkley's argument is successful in helping prove that material substance does not exist because it gets rid of objectivity. Material substance depends on objectivity to exist, by attacking objectivity, he gets rid of material substance.
ReplyDeletePhilonous starts his argument against material substance by stating that anything that “leads a man into an absurdity” is false (14). One example of an absurdity is something being “at the same time both cold and warm” (14). Philonous then sets up the scenario that a person has a hand that is hot and one that is cold. If this person were to put both hands in the same bowl of lukewarm water, he would feel with his hot hand that the water were cold and with his cold hand that the water were hot. It would be an absurdity to believe that the water is both hot and cold. Because it is an absurdity, it is false. Therefore heat is in the mind. The same can be said about the size of a mite’s foot. A person would find it small but a bacterium the mite’s foot is massive. Since an object cannot be both small and massive size must only exist in the mind. The same kind of argument could be used to falsify every physical aspect of every object until every property of material objects is stripped away and only thoughts remain. Because of this, Philonous believes that everything is in the mind and “to be is to be perceived”. I do not believe that the argument works. He bases the entirety of Idealism on the assumption that something cannot have contradicting qualities. In order to disprove his argument a fundamental particle could be used. Something such as a string in string theory would be recognized as small by everything living. There would be no room to argue that there is conflict in size by saying that some perceive it as kind of small while others perceive it as tiny because it is literally too small to be viewed by any living thing. All organisms would only have the description that it is too small to be perceived. Because of this, a string’s size would be a primary quality that does not get falsified by the argument Philonous makes. Since a string’s size is true, one could define the size of a mite’s foot by a string’s size. This would make the size of the foot also a primary quality because it is defined by primary qualities. Just by proving size can be a primary quality shows that Idealism is false since there is at least one physical aspect.
ReplyDeleteIt is said in the Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous that things appear differently to each and every object, both physically and, more importantly, mentally. Berkeley argues that the foot of a human, a mite, and an object as microscopic as a speck of dust all appear differently to one another because of their vast differences in physical size. I supposed that all three objects existed together in one room. I believe Berkeley used a physical analogy to help his reader better understand his argument. While yes, I believe his argument does in fact apply to physical objects, I believe it is more directed toward one’s mind. He argues that each living thing with a mind perceives things differently and, as a result, forms opinions of their own. For example, a peasant living in a small, desolate village in Tibet may have an entirely different outlook and view of the world in comparison to an individual living in America’s “top one percent” in Bel Air, California. These two individuals, according to Berkeley’s argument, see things differently but exist together in the same world. This is similar to how the foot appears incredibly large to the mite, and how the mite appears as enormous to the speck of dust. With theses differences, there remains a constant; the fact that they all exist together in one room, despite their physical size. These objects exist in one room, the constant, just as the Tibetan and Californian exist in one world, their constant. The impoverished Tibetan villager and the privileged Californian, along with the human foot, the mite, and speck of dust, in each circumstance may be completely different when compared, but all exist in one constant, be it the entire planet or simply a room. I believe Berkeley successfully argues that, despite things having complete differences at a small, superficial level, in the greater scheme of things, everything is in fact quite similar because they exist together in that one constant.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley uses the mite argument as a way to dispel the notion that primary qualities exist and prove his idealist beliefs. Berkeley attacks the idea of size which would be considered a primary quality. He first invites us to compare between a human foot, a mite, and a microscopic organism. He states that the mite is small compared to the foot but big compared to the microscopic organism. Since big and small are contradictory and the mite is both big and small than the size of the mite cannot be a primary quality. Berkeley believes that he can use this argument on every single so-called “primary qualities” leaving our perceptions as the only true existence. Berkeley is just plainly delusional and bad at understanding grammar. His entire argument is based on a comparative value. It is impossible for an object to be either big or small on its own because the terms inherently need another independent to compare. This means that whether or not an object is described as big or small the intrinsic property of size has not changed in any way making it still a primary property. For example let’s make a unit of measurement and define it as a specific distance. For the sake of expedience let’s say that this length just happens to be equal to the length of the might. Let’s also say boot is 40 lengths and the microscopic organism is 0.5 lengths. We can then perceive the mite as being smaller than the foot but also bigger than the organism. Both ways the size of the mite is still 1 length and that length is the true primary quality of the mite.
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ReplyDeleteIn George Berkely’s First Dialogue, he has the reader imagine a thought experiment: one consisting of a mite, a human, and a very minute organism of some sort. He states that from the mite’s perspective, its foot is regular sized; from the human’s perspective, the mite’s foot is extremely small; and finally, from the tiny organism’s perspective, gigantic. Next, he rhetorically asks “Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of different dimensions?” (Berkeley 24). In this excerpt he expands this thought experiment to apply to the real world, arguing that anything material exists in the mind because an object cannot have two conflicting qualities, in the case of the mite’s foot, being tiny and humungous at the same time. However, Berkeley’s logic is highly flawed. He fails to consider that such qualities are relative and not binary. For instance, a mansion is very large from my perspective, but a redwood tree dwarfs the mansion. Both are large to me, but at varying degrees; these qualities are merely relative. In other words, if the only thing that existed in the universe was a mite, then it would neither be big or small – it would just be a mite. By ‘giving’ an object size ‘qualities’, I am inherently comparing such an object to another - be it myself, another object, or a whole set of other objects. Concisely, size dimensions are not true qualities of an object, they are comparing one thing to at least one other; this is why Berkeley should not use size dimension as a way to prove ‘esse est percipi’.
ReplyDeleteTo prove idealism, the theory that material substance does not exist and the only things that exist are ideas and minds (the perceivers of ideas), Berkeley presents an argument of relative perception through the example of a mite’s foot. According to humans, Berkeley argues, a mite’s foot is extremely small. On the contrary, a microorganism perceives the mite to be extremely large. Berkeley reasons that since an object cannot simultaneously be two contradictory things, such as “both cold and warm” (14), a mite’s foot cannot be both big and small. Therefore, these properties must not be inherent to the object, but rather exist only in the mind of the perceiver. Berkeley extends this idea to argue that no physical properties are inherent to an object, making material substances just collections of ideas. Thus, according to Philonous, everything exists only as an idea in the mind; to be is to be perceived.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley’s argument successfully proves that perceptions of objects are subjective. That is, whether an object is considered to be “hot or cold” or “big or small” does indeed rely on the qualities of the perceiver. However, Berkeley does not prove why this understanding means that material substance does not exist. He proves that a material substance’s qualities depend on the perceiver, but these two statements are not equivalent. I believe it makes more sense to say that the same material substance can simultaneously create two contradictory perceptions, as long as we take into consideration the point of view of whoever perceives the substance. I might perceive a math test to be extremely difficult while my friend might perceive it to be very straightforward. This does not affect whether the test is or is not real, or whether it is or is not a material substance. Rather, it proves that the difficulty of the test – a property of the test – is subjective. Thus, it should be considered natural for material substances to be perceived differently by perceivers of different vantage points.
Berkeley’s argument involving the mite, human, and microorganism attempts to prove that qualities of an object do not exist but in the mind, as they are inconsistent across perceptions. In the example he provides, a mite would see a human’s foot as large, its own foot as neither large nor small, and a microorganism as small. However, the microorganism would see itself as being neither large nor small, and the mite and human as being large. The human would consider both the mite and the organism to be small. In other words, when relying upon perception, an object may be both large and small, an obvious impossibility. Thus, Berkeley concludes, the state of largeness or smallness is only in the mind of the perceiver, not in the object of perception.
ReplyDeleteBerkeley’s general argument that all properties of an object are in the mind of the perceiver is applied to all other objects, sounds, sensations, etc. that are perceived. As objects can appear entirely different when under a microscope, Berkeley argues that this means that shape and visual qualities of an object are not intrinsic to it, but imposed upon it by the perspective of a viewer. Similarly, as the same water could feel hot to one who is cold, and cold to one who is hot, temperature is only existent in the mind. Thus, what were previously ‘primary qualities’ of an object (size, temperature, shape, etc.) are ‘sucked into the mind.’
Berkeley’s argument is completely ineffective, as it fails to recognize the difference between subjective descriptors and objective qualities. His argument is correct in stating that a microorganism would consider a mite big, while a human would consider it small. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that size only exists in the mind. For the sake of argument, let us say that a microorganism can operate a ruler. If both said microorganism and the human were to measure the size of the mite’s foot, they would reach an equal length, perhaps 1 mm. What differs is whether the two consider 1 mm large or small. No matter what they may think, this does not mean that 1 mm is not an objective length that exists. So, perception of relative size may differ from perspective to perspective, but actual size does not. The same is true for temperature (which is an objective measurement of transfer of thermal energy that can be perceived subjectively as ‘hot’ or ‘cold’) and shape (which can be objectively measured through geometry; seeing the shape from a different perspective does not mean that the shape must change). Essentially, we can use a more objective way of describing objects to avoid sucking their qualities into the mind. Thermal energy, measurements by ruler or yardstick, and conventions of geometry are not subjective. Descriptors of opinion (relative heat and size) are not considered an objective standard, but to express one’s own experience with perception. Insofar as we do not declare the latter to be the objective perception of an object, we have no need of sucking properties into the mind, since we possess objective measures to accurately describe perception.
In his dialogues, Berkeley uses several examples to create and justify idealism. Idealism, as defined by Berkeley, is the concept that there is no existing material substance, and that everything in which we believe “exists” is merely a bundle of ideas being perceived by the mind. While initially seeming to be completely far-fetched and illogical, Berkeley gives several examples to support his bold claim. The primary of which involves a human foot, a mite and a microscopic organism, which Berkeley uses to illustrate the role of relativity in idealism’s justification. From the microorganism’s perspective, the mite seems to be an unfathomably large creature, while the human’s foot alone is exponentially bigger than the mite. Berkeley has just shown how physical qualities like size are perceived differently in the mind of each being. Expanding his idea of physical properties being mere perceptions, Berkeley gives other supporting examples such as bad smells appearing pleasant to others, and clouds changing color as then sun moves behind them. By proving that every aspect of material substance is simply perceived in the mind, Berkeley proclaims that there must be no actual physical matter. Because an object cannot be multiple things at once, which it is in the minds of different perceivers, everything must be a collection of ideas that are perceived and exist in the mind. I do not believe that this argument makes sense because I know I am experiencing material substance every day, but I cannot think of any actual scenario that disproves Berkeley’s argument. So, while it seems to defy common sense, I believe Berkeley’s argument is absurd but well supported and justified.
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